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ISSN 0921-0210 ABSTRACT 
As one of the main agents of globalisation, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) have been revolutionising many aspects of human life, affecting 
among other things, how wealth is generated and distributed. Due to the potential role 
of ICTs in generating growth, developing countries are struggling about how to 
implement effective strategies to foster growth and eventually ‘leapfrog’ steps of 
development. In this process, the state has, with its presence or absence, an 
unquestionable role. During the last decade in Uruguay, the ICTs sector had a better 
performance than any other economic sector, maintaining its dynamism despite a 
severe economic recession that has affected the country since 1998. At first glance, 
there has not been a coherent, well articulated state policy to promote ICTs. What is 
more, some of the state initiatives on the sector were only partially implemented, or 
dismantled soon after created. However, assuming that there is no state role is a deep 
flaw. Based on the empirical evidence and on the analysis of the opinions of key 
actors involved, the paper argues that certain pre-conditions, where the state has a key 
role, made this performance possible. An early creation of high quality informatics 
tertiary education, an efficient public telecommunication infrastructure, and a 
regulatory framework that includes tax exemptions. Currently, further development of 
the ICT sector will require a new state role. This role, also applicable to other 
developing countries, has to do with increasing investment on education and R&D, 
strength the telecommunications infrastructure, defining a coherent state policy as a 
ICTs consumer, promoting capital risk investment, and facilitating private actors 
access to foreign markets. 
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The Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been 
revolutionising many aspects of human life all over the world for at least the last 
quarter century. As one of the main agents of globalisation, ICTs are making the 
process technically possible and increasingly faster. Among other consequences, the 
global interconnection is affecting how wealth is generated and thus how it is 
distributed. Since development has to do with the allocation of resources in a society 
and among different countries and regions, the state is a key player in the arena of 
conflict and cooperation where the distribution takes place. So, with its presence or 
absence, the state has an unquestionable role in the development process. 
The development of the ICT sector in rich countries has been strengthening 
their economic growth, moving them even further away from the underdeveloped 
world. Due to the potential role of ICTs in generating growth, the last decade has seen 
an important amount of literature focused on how poor countries can implement 
strategies strongly based on ICTs to fuel growth and eventually allow these societies 
to  ‘leapfrog’  steps of development. However, not that much critical mass can be 
found about the possible strategies of comparatively small, in size, population and 
GDP, developing countries situated in the upper level of this developing category. 
Countries possessing a certain level of human development and relatively low poverty 
rates which can be more than mere receptors of technology, but at the same time has 
not size and wealth levels to implement a big scale endogenous technological process. 
 
ICTs in Uruguay 
In 1950 Uruguay had a GDP per capita four times bigger than Korea and five 
times bigger than Taiwan. However, during the second half of the 20
th century, 
Uruguay showed very low growth rates compared to its neighbours, just 1.8% average 
GDP growth rate against a Latin American one of 3.5% during that period (Torres, 
2003: 24-27). The current South Korean GDP is more than four times the Uruguayan 
one. In spite of this poor general performance, when we go deep into recent 
Uruguayan ICTs sector performance, we realise that the situation is significantly 
different. Moreover, some analysts are talking about an emerging ‘success story’. 
The Human Development Report of 2001 was focused particularly on the 
impact of ICTs on development (UNDP, 2001). The report presented an Index of 
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Technological Progress that ranks the countries into five categories: 1. ‘Leaders’, 
countries such as USA, Finland or Sweden and the rest of G7 nations; 2. ‘Potential 
Leaders’, for example Spain or Mexico; 3. ‘Dynamic Followers’, with Uruguay being 
the first position of this category, the 38th place in overall ranking, ahead of big 
countries like South Africa, Brazil or China; 4. ‘Marginalized’, including countries 
such as Nicaragua, Senegal or Nepal; and finally 5. ‘Others’, for countries where no 
data is available, like Afghanistan. 
In the regional contexts, Uruguay presented at the very beginning of this 
century several indicators that place it into a comparatively advantageous situation. 
Figures that correspond with the situation of 1999 showed that the quantity of 
computers per 1,000 inhabitants in Uruguay was 99.6, the highest in Latin America, 
well ahead of Chile (66.6) and doubling Argentina (49.2)
1 Considering 
telecommunications, 100% of the infrastructure was already digital, there were 400 
telephone lines (fixed plus mobile) per 1,000 inhabitants, also being the highest 
telecommunication density of the continent (UNDP, 2001). Finally, an indicator of 
internet penetration normally used is the number of internet hosts per 10 thousand 
inhabitants. At that moment, there were 163,8 in Uruguay, doubling the figures of the 
nearest follower Argentina (73.8) and three times that of Chile (49.8).
2
However, since 1998 Uruguay went into a deep economic recession with a 
constant drop of its GDP for five subsequent years. The crisis turned into a virtual 
collapse with the financial crack of its giant neighbour Argentina at the end of 2001 
that provoked, in mid 2002, a severe reduction of foreign reserves and subsequently a 
devaluation of the local currency. Measured in current dollars, from a peak of 
$22.08bn in 1998, the GDP went into a tailspin down to $11.17bn in 2003, a striking 
constriction of 50%.
3
It is easy to imagine that those mentioned technological indicators did not 
remain unscathed. In terms of computers Uruguay fell to the second place with 110 
computers per 1.000 habitants after Chile, with 119. The situation is similar with 
telephone density, Chile being in the first place with 658 phone lines, ahead of 
Uruguay’s 473. As for internet hosts Uruguay remains ahead with 257 per 10 
                                                 
1  Source: ITU <www.itu.int>, accessed 20
th July 2003. 
2  Source: Internet Software Consortium <www.isc.org>, accessed on 23
rd July 2003. 
3 Data from Uruguayan Central Bank (BCU) published in weekly Búsqueda, Montevideo, 16th 
September 2004. 
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thousands inhabitants, followed closely by Argentina (200,7) and Chile (137,6) 
(UNDP, 2004: 180-183). 
On the other hand, the exports of high tech still show dynamism. In its best 
period, exports of ICT products had grown 1,330% between 1996 and 2001 and 
represented the latter year 2.5 % of total exports (CID, 2003: 304). During 2002, 
considering only the software sector, exports totalled $80m, 3.7% of total exports and 
an amount close to the level of some of the most traditional primary exports such as 
dairy products or textiles (Stolovich, 2003: 4). That year, software exports were more 
than ten times that of wine ($6.5m) considered a successful agro-industrial sector with 
several state promoted policies. In addition to this, between 1998 and 2002, while 
general exports fell 33% in current dollars, the value of exports of software products 
went up in exactly the same proportion (see figures 4.3 and 4.4). 
Given these figures, in recent years, some specialised publications and 
analysts started to talk about Uruguay with the type of adjectives and comparatives 
that are used in the ICT jargon all over the world, such as ‘Celtic Tiger’ for Ireland or 
‘Bombay Silicon Valley’ for India. In this regard, in specialised press articles and 
reports can be found expressions like: ‘Uruguayan Massala’ (Latin Trade Magazine, 
January 2004), ‘The Example of Software sector in Uruguay’ (newspaper  El 
Mercurio, Santiago de Chile, 2003) or ’The Dublin of the South’ (Edelman;Regent, et 
al., 2003). 
Even in the case of not wanting to use such strong labels to characterise the 
Uruguayan ICT sector performance, some questions arise about this phenomenon. For 
example, what are the main possible explanations of significant growth, particularly in 
such a recessive context, as the one mentioned. Is the result of a long run national 
strategy, or just the consequence of an efficient and competitive local private sector? 
Have there been any significant exogenous elements, like heavy foreign direct 
investment on the sector? In a broader perspective, which socio-economic 
characteristics of the country are contributing to make this phenomenon possible? 
There are some questions that particularly grab the attention of this research that is to 
what extent is the role of the state a key explaining variable? Is the state 
accomplishing things at the ICT sector that it is not doing at the other sectors in 
Uruguay? 
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Background 
The few studies that already exist about the ICTs sector in Uruguay come from 
other approaches than development or policy analysis ones. Most are from economic 
or management related disciplines that base the analysis on the impact of the ICT 
sector on employment (Notaro, 2002), on how to improve its management 
performance (Edelman;Regent, et al., 2003), or on the export potential of Uruguayan 
software products (Gonzato and Arenas, 2001). Other studies come from scholars of 
the computer or telecommunication sphere, and are focused on hardware, 
infrastructure, or programming issues. 
From the social science perspective, the literature of National Systems of 
Innovation, focused on science and technology policies, points out the importance of 
well articulated policies with adequate levels of public spending on R&D (Sutz and 
Arocena, 1998). Further works of the same authors analyse the relation of knowledge 
and innovation in Latin America in general and Uruguay in particular. From a north-
south, or ‘centre-periphery’, perspective they argue that the continent and the country 
are loosing innovative capacity (Arocena and Sutz, 2003). Other national works using 
the innovation approach, but more from an economic perspective, study a sample of 
the 20 biggest exporters of the Uruguayan software industry and find relevant levels 
of international competitiveness due to their innovation capacity (Mejía and Rieiro, 
2002). 
Closer to policy analysis literature, some other works have been centred on e-
government initiatives in Uruguay and the process of incorporation of ICT inside the 
bureaucracy apparatus as part of the state reform paradigm of New Public 
Management (Frick, 2001). In a similar line of analysis, some studies of state reform 
and institutional analysis referred to specific initiatives inside the state related to ICTs 
such as the National Committee for the Information Society (CNSI) (Girard, 2001). 
The literature that analyse the impact of ICT on civil society and institutions at 
the local levels should also be noted. A comparative study across Latin America 
includes the analysis of Uruguay and also provides general elements that can be 
applied to it (Bonilla and Cliche, 2004: ;Roggiero, 2004). One of the works, referred 
to the impact of ICT on local governments, from a sociological perspective, compares 
the capital cities of Uruguay and Argentina in terms of local government and the 
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incorporation of ICTs by the NGOs. This is one of the very few studies that analyses 
the role of local NGOs in this field in Uruguay (Finquelievich and others, 2004). 
In contrast, and in a certain way surprisingly, there is not a lot of academic 
production from policy analysis or development studies that, in the general context of 
the ICTs and development, specifically study the role of the state in the process. In 
this regard, it is necessary to shed some light generating theoretical and analytical 
elements to contribute to the local and regional debate on the topic. 
 
Purpose of the paper 
This paper analyses what had been hitherto the state role in the promotion of 
the Information and Communication Technology sector, particularly the software and 
telecommunications sub-sectors, in Uruguay during the last two government periods 
from 1995 to 2004. It will characterise how the different initiatives are articulated or 
not into a certain strategy and up to what extent they can explain the country’s 
performance in this area. Finally, it will critically present the opinions of the key 
actors involved in the process regarding the state role, to say what it should and 
should not do, and what can be the consequences of the different types of 
intervention. In addition to this, alongside the analysis made during the paper, some 
generalisations for developing countries are provided based on the Uruguayan 
experience. 
As limitations of the paper, it should be noted that the focus lies on 
telecommunication and software areas, not including other new technologies such as 
biotechnology. Furthermore, the paper scope is on the state role over the development 
of the sector itself, in terms of production and export levels, and not on the degree of 
incorporation of the ICTs into the general industrial and services structure that, the 
research is aware, also has a relevant impact on development. 
 
Methodology 
In order to achieve this purpose, a research strategy with three main 
components was applied. First, a wide and deep literature review; second, the analyses 
of the secondary data available for the country in a regional comparative perspective; 
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third, primary data generated through interviews to key relevant actors of the ICT 
sector in the country.
4
In reference to the literature review, a significant amount of articles, journals, 
periodicals, books, reports from institutions and other specialised publications were 
reviewed to construct the analytical framework. Apart from the general bibliography 
which was useful in the different steps of the work, the specific ones that were 
incorporated into the paper are detailed in the ‘References’ list. 
The secondary data can be divided into three main areas. First, laws and 
regulations that constitutes the legal framework of the ICT sector in Uruguay.
5 
Second, updated socio-economic statistical data and technological indicators from 
several official Uruguayan statistical agencies, as well as regional or international 
ones.
6 Third, press reviews for what was used a previously generated database with 
the news related to the topic and complemented with a review of the news for the last 
year along the national and international press.
7
In third place, a particularly relevant component of this paper, the primary data 
is constituted by the perspectives of the main actors of the Uruguayan ICT sector 
obtained through 15 interviews. The criteria to select the interviewees was the 
condition of qualified informers for their due to their position at the different areas of 
the ICT sector. They are high level hierarchical personnel that make the strategic and 
policy decisions at their respective institutions or enterprises, or in the case of experts, 
they have a wide and deep knowledge of the sector and their opinion is broadly 
accepted as a reference. 
Even though it is not strictly a sample, the 15 interviews cover a reasonable 
portion of the public and private sphere. At least one interviewee of every public 
institutions involved in the ICT sector and the most significant private actors in their 
                                                 
4 The interviews and the press review were conducted by the author during the first semester of 2003 as 
part of his research activities at the Institute of Political Science of the UdelaR and were financed by a 
research fellowship from  the Commission of Scientific Research (CSIC) of the UdelaR, Montevideo. 
5 Sources used: Uruguayan Parliament <www.parlamento.gub.uy>. The Decrees of the Presidency and 
other administrative dispositions were updated from: www.presidencia.gub.uy. Referred to the 
regulatory framework, URSEC: <www.ursec.gub.uy>. 
6 Sources: National Institute of Statistics (INE) <www.ine.gub.uy> and Uruguayan Central Bank 
<www.bcu.gub.uy>. For the regional and international level the United Nations Organisation for 
Telecommunications (ITU) <www.itu.int>. 
7 The two major national newspapers from Uruguay were reviewed: ‘El Observador’ 
<www.observa.com.uy> and ‘El País’: <www.elpais.com.uy>. The international press accessible at the 
ISS library was regularly consulted since September 2003, principally Financial Times (London), El 
País (Madrid) and the weekly The Economist (London). 
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respective sub-sector. The distribution of interviews by area is as follows: local and 
foreign software and consultancy enterprises (5 interviews), private 
telecommunications and data transmission companies (2), the telecommunication 
SOE (1), public and private universities (3 and 2) and the Regulatory Agency 
(URSEC) in charge on communication services (1). 
The interviews were conducted personally by the author and took place in 
Montevideo in July and August 2003. All but one, were personal interviews.
8 A semi-
structured questionnaire was utilised and the interviews were recorded audibly, then 
translated and processed according to the research objectives. An agreement of 
confidentiality was made with all the interviewees in order to generate a reserve 
context that improves the quality of information they provide. As a consequence, 
when quoted in the text, their opinions will be identified with numbers (see table 4.1). 
 
Structure of the paper 
The present chapter 1 constitutes the Introduction and defines the scope and 
limitations of analysis of the paper, the methodology used, and the research 
instruments applied. In chapter 2, a theoretical discussion of the type of role, capacity, 
and degree of autonomy of the state to define and implement promotion policies in 
development strategies is presented. 
Chapter 3 is centred on defining the concept of ICT itself and goes through 
some of the specific characteristics of the sector that are considered relevant to 
explicit. Also, a general overview of the literature from a comparative perspective 
about the main dimensions of the ICTs and its link with development is given. 
Chapter 4 is divided into three parts. The first one presents the main ICT 
indicators from Uruguay. Secondly, the policies and initiatives of the last decade will 
be briefly described. Thirdly, the opinions and perceptions of the actors of the ICT 
sectors based mainly on the conducted interviews but also incorporating elements of 
other interviews that have appeared in the press. 
Finally, chapter 5 presents the concluding remarks based on the literature 
review, the analysis of the interviews and the empirical evidence founded. 
                                                 
8 Interview identified with No. 12, to the CEO of an International software company was done by e-
mail.  
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Furthermore, some future lines of research of elements that exceed the scope of this 
paper will be suggested. 
 
 
2  DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND THE STATE 
They confuse the basic issue. In the contemporary world, withdrawal and 
involvement are not the alternatives. State involvement is given. The appropriate 
question is not, ‘how much,’ but ‘what kind? (Peter Evans).
9
 
2.1 Development  strategies 
The development strategy approach of Stephan Haggard (Haggard, 1990) and 
his subsequent works with Robert Kaufman (Haggard and Kauffman, 1992) provides 
useful analytical tools to understand why different development strategies are chosen, 
persist, and change in time and among countries. Haggard points out two elements 
about development strategies of developing countries that are relevant for the research 
objective. First, the idea that most of the time, development strategies emerge by-
default, by trial and error, and are normally plagued by internal inconsistency which 
take years to crystallize. Second, the conceptualisation of strategies consisting of 
‘packages of policies’; so disaggregating them is useful to identify different cleavages 
and conflicts (Haggard, 1990: 74). 
Even in the cases considered successful on ICTs such as Costa Rica, scholars 
identify an erratic definition of a development strategy, as “not the result of any 
collective or explicit decision […]no grand national vision is responsible”, but more 
as a result of multiple policies and events  (Rodriguez-Clare, 2002: 79). So, for the 
purpose of this paper, we will consider a development strategy as an analytical 
construction ex-post rather than a pre-existent and clearly defined policy.  In this 
regard, to characterise the strategy is necessary to analyse the different policies and 
instruments that are directly and indirectly intervening in the ICT sector performance 
in a particular space-time context. Before going into the analysis of the policies, it is 
relevant to briefly describe the socio-economic and policy paradigm context where 
these strategies are implemented in the Latin American continent. 
 
                                                 
9 In: (Evans, 1995: 10). 
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Structural Adjustment 
After the so-called “lost decade” of the 80’s when the foreign debt burden 
stifled Latin American growth, all governments in the continent were strongly 
conditioned by the financial institutions and private bankers to implement severe 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) under the “Washington Consensus” 
paradigm (Williamson, 1990). These adjustment programmes implied an extensive 
process of redefinition of the state-market borders, and so of what role the state should 
play in promoting development. Despite some country particularities, in general the 
policies aimed to liberalize capital flows in order to facilitate foreign direct 
investment (FDI); reduce fiscal deficit mainly by cutting public spending; promote 
total o partial privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs); dismantled any type of 
regulations that distorted market prices, and enhanced the institutional mechanisms 
that assure property rights. 
The study of the characteristics and consequences of the process in Latin 
America is extensive in the literature, from more comprehensive and theoretical 
works (Haggard and Kauffman, 1992: ;Stalling, 1992) to others focused on specific 
dimensions of the political process of liberalization policies (Acuña;Smith, et al., 
1994: ;Torre, 1998).  Clearly, in most of the countries there were severe negative 
consequences to the reforms in terms of deterioration of Human Capital and growing 
inequality, poverty and unemployment (Stalling and Peres, 2000). 
In terms of growth, South America achieved lower levels of economic growth 
in the 90’s, than in the 60’s and 70’s. In the first half of the 90’s, during the 
implementations of the SAP’s, the GDP per capita growth rate was 2.5%, while in the 
second half the rate dropped to an average of 0.8% per year. In Uruguay, the contrast 
between the two halves of the decade was also strong: 3.2% for the first half, and 
1.4% in the second, with four years of recession (Morley and Vos, 2003).
10 The 
severe consequences of the recession on ICTs indicators will be presented in chapter 
4.1. 
 
                                                 
10 Authors use as source for their calculations WB Data presented in table 1 page 4. In the foot note of 
that table, they define ‘recession’ as “a year of negative per capita income growth”.  
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Post Washington Consensus and the Neo-Institutionalism 
The recognition to these effects, even from the multilateral and financing 
organizations, put into question the precepts of the pro-market orthodoxy, and allowed 
the emergence of a new paradigm called the “Post-Washington Consensus” (Stiglitz, 
1998). This new framework brings the state back in with a central active role in 
implementing policies to promote development. There is a key state role in generating 
the regulatory frameworks necessary to promote competence and to improve the 
articulation between state and market, in order to “achieve growth with social equity” 
(Katz, 2000a: 49). In this sense, effective institutions became crucial for development. 
The neo-institutional approach argues the determinant role of institutions in 
explaining economic performance of nations in the long run, coining the claim 
“institutions matter” (North, 1990). The central argument of this perspective is that 
effective institutions setting generate a stable and predictable structure of human 
interaction, which would reduce transaction costs thus improving economic 
performance. The transaction costs are “measurement” to set value to what is being 
exchanged; and “policing” to protect rights and assure the fulfilment of agreements 
(North, 1990: 27). The weaker the institution, the higher the cost of measurement and 
policing, because institutions “provide the structure for exchange that (together with 
the technology employed) determines the cost of transacting…” (North, 1990: 34). 
The characteristics of social, political and economic institutions will determine 
which way the state is capable to orientate the private actors into a certain collective 
goal by setting a framework of  rules that “define the way the game is played” (North, 
1990: 4).  In this theoretical framework, recent works from the IADB have shed light 
over the type of necessary institutions for ICT development in Latin America 
(Valenti, 2002).  In this regard, during the description of ICT policies in chapter 4.2, 
as well as the interviews analyses of key actors in chapter 4.3, the paper pays special 
attention to the characteristics and functions of the institutions involved in the ICT 
development process. 
 
2.2  State roles and development 
In this context, Latin American states shift to a more pro-active development 
approach. National and local governments have tried to carry on public policies in 
different sectors which allow nations to strengthen economic growth and improve 
  10 
their position in the world economy. Peter Evans proposed a categorization of state 
roles that would help us to analyse the type of interventions, at distinct moments and 
among different sectors, the state can perform. The author characterised two pairs of 
state roles as being “custodian and demiurge” and “midwifery and husbandry”.
11
•  Custodian:  A role associated mainly with minimal states, which acts as a 
regulator. The state clamps down on certain private sector practices or 
activities that are considered unwanted, so it privileges policing over 
promotion. Some custodial regulations can also have “promotional facets” 
(Evans, 1995: 78). 
•  Demiurge: Implies a direct intervention in production of normal commodities 
replacing local private capital. The state goes into the market “based on a 
stronger assumption about the limitations of the private capital” (Evans, 1995: 
79). The author highlights the “expansionary logic” of the demiurge role, 
identifying the SOEs as the illustration par excellence of that role. 
•  Midwifery: In a context of weakness of local companies, the state does not 
substitute them, like in the demiurge, but tries to encourage or induce them 
into a certain sector or strategy that they would not get into by their own 
initiative “creating the conditions that led entrepreneurial groups to identify 
their interests with the growth of the sector and commit resources to it” 
(Evans, 1995: 210). Through instruments like a green-house of tariffs, the state 
protects a sector from foreign competition which reduces the “risk or 
uncertainty” which allows the private sector to invest and grow (Evans, 1995: 
80). 
•  Husbandry:  A role to motivate and assist private entrepreneurial actors, 
develop certain organizations to be in charge of complementary areas that 
involve risk such as R&D. It’s a “combination of support and prodding” 
(Evans, 1995: 81). This role overlaps with midwifery, but the private 
counterparts in that particular sector are already existent. 
As we will see in the analysis of the Uruguayan state role in the ICT sector, 
these ‘ideal types’ of state roles do not appear in pure condition. So, in a certain 
‘weberian’ methodology approach, we contrast these ideal constructions against 
                                                 
11 This taxonomy of state roles is used by  Evans throughout his work, but is mainly explained in 
Chapter 4, particularly pp. 77- 81 (Evans, 1995). 
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reality. The characterisation of a state role arises from the analysis of the 
combinations of instruments and how articulated they are into a certain strategy. This 
combination of instruments, not always coherently articulated, is what defines the role 
of the state in a particular economic sector during a certain period of time. 
Furthermore, the state can play, and normally does, different roles according to the 
type of sector that it refers. 
 
2.3  State autonomy and the capacity to promote growth 
Evans put into question the neo-utilitarian vision of the state which considers that an 
increasing state intervention with developmental policies also increases the generation of 
rents. So, the private actors will be more interested in seeking those rents rather than 
generating value with entrepreneurial effort. From his perspective, and particularly in the ICT 
sector, evidence shows that the type of relation set between bureaucrats and ‘clients’ that the 
neo-utilitarian vision claim, is in “sharp contrast” with reality (Evans, 1995: 223). In this 
virtuous articulation of the state intervention and entrepreneurial effort, the issue of autonomy 
of the state to design and implement policies becomes crucial. 
 
State autonomy 
The concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ elaborated  by Evans allows us to 
interpret how states are able, or not, to design and implement their policies in a 
context of self determination of goals, with an effective application of instruments to 
achieve them. The author develops the concept comparing what he defines as 
‘predatory states’ such as Zaire, against successful ‘developmental states’ such as 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea. He defines embedded autonomy as a particular articulation 
of bureaucracy and society in an “apparently contradictory combination of Weberian 
bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding social structure” 
(Evans, 1992: 154). 
From this perspective, in order to achieve successful implementation of 
policies, it is necessary to consider not only the institutional framework, qualifications 
and the degree of autonomy of civil servants in charge of designing the policy, but 
also their formal and informal links with the private sector. Considering autonomy 
and embeddednes as an indivisible pair, one without the other can “produce perverse 
results” (Evans, 1997: 68). As the author recognises, “embedded autonomy is a useful 
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analytical guidepost”, not an “engineer formula” that can be implemented despite the 
context, the type of state or the historical times (Evans, 1995: 244). 
In this particular combination, the internal ties that give coherence to the 
bureaucracy and efficiency to the civil service are key issues, but the “external 
networks connecting the state and civil society are even more important” (Evans, 
1995: 49).  More recently, other authors are starting to apply this approach of 
‘embedded autonomy’  to the ICT policy analysis in local governments in India 
(Kaushik and Singh, 2004). 
Complementary to these perspectives of autonomy and efficiency, the works 
of Alice Amsden suggest lessons for Latin America that can be learned from the 
‘High Performing Asian Economies’ (HPAE).
12 Taking
 the case of Taiwan, the author 
focuses the attention to the role of state intervention and the interaction with the 
private sector in promoting the high tech sector (Amsden, 2004). In this regard, the 
“reciprocal principal ” (Amsden, 1994: 632) constitutes a key issue to analyse types 
and consequences of state role in promoting the ICT sector. 
This concept is a basic component of the virtuous cycle in the relation between 
the public and private sphere. The idea is that state gives protection to strengthen the 
domestic market, as well as other incentives and guidance, defined to be coherent with 
the export led growth strategy.  Along the same lines of “public private synergy”, are 
the works that analyse the division of labour between state and private sector, 
generating a better output than the simple aggregation of efforts of both actors, in a 
logic of  a win-win game (Evans, 1996a: ;1996b). The synergy approach implies a 
certain grey border zone between the public-private spheres, seeing them more in a 
complementary role, conciliating the traditional state–market dichotomy. In this 
sense, they are “more suitable to develop positive ties between state and society” 
(Evans, 1996a: 1036). 
On the other hand, it should be noted that in the WB and other liberal 
perspectives, the ‘Asian Miracle’ is attributed to macroeconomic policies which 
generated a market friendly framework for investment (Campos and Root, 1996; 
Page, 1994; Porter and Takeuhi, 1999). In this perspective the  market  is  the  driving 
                                                 
12 Apart from Japan, the HPAE includes South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore: the ‘4 
Tigers’; and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, considered as the East Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries ( NIC’s). 
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force of this phenomenon, a view strongly aligned to the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
Even if they recognise “fundamental and selective interventions” (Page, 1994: 618) 
from the public sector, they consider the role of the state as being able to, “create a 
socio-political environment conducive to economic growth” (Campos and Root, 1996: 
1). 
After the East Asian financial crisis in late 1997, the role of the state 
intervention to promote economic growth was severely under question.
  Some focus 
the cause of the crisis on the process of liberalization of capital flow which increased 
vulnerability to external shocks (Bird and Milne, 1999; Wade and Vernoso, 1998). On 
the other hand, strongly liberal views support the idea that the crisis was mainly 
produced because of the strong state intervention (Porter and Takeuhi, 1999). As we 
will see in the interviews analysis, this debate between direct state intervention and a 
more indirect role generating a market friendly environment is also present among 
Uruguayan ICTs actors. 
Finally, it is relevant to consider to what extent autonomy assures that the state 
is more capable of implementing certain development strategies or particular policies. 
Some authors argue that autonomy improves state capacity, but it is not the only 
element. Autonomy gives the state space and margin to act and decide independently 
from other non-state actors, but “you still need the capacity to take informed, coherent 
decisions…” (Polidano, 1998: 6). So, for the purpose of this paper we use the concept 
of ‘state capacity’, or more specifically, the ‘public sector capacity’ as, “the ability of 
the permanent administrative machinery of government to implement policies, deliver 
services and provide policy advice to decision makers” (Polidano, 2000: 805). 
Following the author’s argumentation we will pay particular attention to three key 
aspects of the state capacity: i) despotic power as the freedom to make decisions 
without major constrains; ii) policy capacity as the ability to make decisions in a 
coordinated process and considering all information available; and iii) implementation  
authority as the ability to put those decisions into practice and ensure the enforcement 
of law in general (Polidano, 2000: 809). 
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3 ICT  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
The Computer is not the only technological innovation of recent years, but it does 
constitute the common factor that speeds the development of all others, it will al-




3.1  Definition of ICT 
The possible definitions of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) are as vast as the literature that refers to it. A broad definition includes all the 
technical systems that generate process, transform and transmit information in any 
form. Despite including other sub-sectors, we will focus our analysis to software and 
telecommunications sectors that are the biggest and generally accepted as the most 
important ones included on ICTs sector.
14  
The software industry has changed significantly the last years. In the past there 
was a clear differentiation between software, hardware and other consultancy areas. 
Nowadays the borders are much less clear, and there is a general tendency to consider 
all of them the IT sector or in cases simply the software sector. Also the profitability 
of the different areas has changed dramatically. A traditionally hardware brand like 
IBM, nowadays obtains half of its revenues at world level from other products but of 
hardware.
15 Currently, the hardware production is not the only font of revenues at the 
IT industry, not even the biggest part of the pie. In this transformation process, the 
software and consultancy area became a more attractive, and easier to access, markets 
for relatively small companies and countries that would not be able to afford the 
necessary infrastructure for a huge hardware industry. 
So, for the purpose of this paper we will refer to the software sector as all the 
companies, public or private, that generate products and services necessary for the 
ICT sector to work such as programmes, hardware, specific developments, 
consultancy, installation of infrastructure, etc. We will consider the  
                                                 
13 Quoted in: (May, 2002: 13). 
14 The telecommunications sector is the third biggest sector in the world, even ahead of oil and gas. The 
software sector is at the eight places globally with a global market of $ 693 billion dollars. The biggest 
software company, Microsoft, is the second biggest of the world in terms of market value. Source: 
‘Global 5000’, in Financial Times 27
th of May 2004, p. 6.  
15 Information provided in a personal communication with CEO of IBM Uruguay. In this particular 
country the proportion of the revenues from non-hardware products are even higher than world 
averages of 50% of the total. 
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telecommunication sector as the companies, public and private, that provide local and 
international phone connectivity, mobile and fixed and any type of internet access and 
data transferring services. Along the paper we will refer to ‘ICT sector’ as both, 
software and telecommunication sector, together. 
 
Product cycle 
If we want to critically understand the state role in the promotion of a certain 
economic sector, it is essential to deeply know the particularities of that sector. One of 
the main challenges of state at developing countries is to foster the export capacity of 
the ICT sector, so we must deeply understand the foreign trade dynamics of the 
product. In that sense, the classic work of Raymond Vernon about international trade 
and ‘product cycle’ provides useful elements. Even though the work is almost forty 
years old, it is very relevant to explain the variables intervening when multinationals 
“vertically integrated and self-sustaining” (Vernon, 1966: 198) decide where to set its’ 
production units. This is a key theoretical issue because is generally accepted that one 
of the main state duties in ICT promotion is to attract foreign direct investment. 
The author explains the different stages of product development, and are easily 
applicable to ICT ones. As scholars and technicians agree to argue, software products 
are  becoming a mature and standardised product, thus  “at an advanced stage in the 
standardization of some products, the less developed countries may offer competitive 
advantages as a production location” (Vernon, 1966: 202). This perspective is useful 
to analyse why huge corporations decide to install their production units like Intel in 
Costa Rica or TATA Software in Uruguay. What is more, as we will see in chapter 4, 
the type of software produced in Uruguay is one of high levels of specification and a 
relatively reduced content of automatic programming, thus is a high income and 
labour saving products that generally is produced in developed countries “in the early 
stages of their existence and importing them later on” (Vernon, 1966). 
The way how the states can identify the best place to insert the national ICT 
production in that developmental trajectory is a key variable that will explain which 
promoting role the state aim to play. As we will see in the interviews, companies 
would pursue the goal to be closer to the innovative side of the product cycle, as it is 
where the higher margins of revenues are located. Also, not surprisingly, is where 
only biggest world companies can afford to be. So, small companies from developing 
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countries will require state support to change their position in the international 
division of labour, particularly at the ICT sector.
16
 
3.2  ICTs and development 
In order to understand the priority given by sates to that sector, and so the 
public policies implemented to promote it, it has to be noted the expected relation that 
it has with general development. The discussion over ICT and development was set in 
the global agenda since the first major documents of World Development Report 1998 
and the Human Development Report 2001(UNDP, 2001). These documents framed 
the discussion over increasingly sophisticated indicators of ICT, its components, ways 
of aggregating them and how to weight each of them in order to estimate the real 
impact that the ICT sector growth can produce over the general development of 
nations. 
Among the more recent works on this area, it can be referred the works that 
tries to combine data of developed with that of developing countries (Archibugui, 
2004), or the report of other multilateral organizations that provide increasingly 
sophisticated indicators to estimate ICT impact on economic (OECD, 2001, 2002, 
2003). Particularly about Latin America some initial works relate strongly  the growth 
of the ICT sector with development (Castells and Laserna, 1994). In the same line, 
several documents of  ECLAC explore extensively that relation (CEPAL, 2000a; 
Katz, 2000b). Other works from the Latin American perspective support the strong 
correlation between ICT and development  (Castaldi;Cimoli, et al., 2004) and 
specially a relevant comparative study focused on the digital divide for the whole 
continent made by ALADI (ALADI, 2003). 
Other Uruguayan scholars analyse the relation of knowledge and innovation in 
Latin America from a north south, or ‘centre-periphery’, perspective. Studying the 
characteristics and relations between universities and the entrepreneurial sector, they 
argue that far from converging, the current globalisation is increasing the gap in 
innovation capacity between Latin America and centre countries. This is what they 
call a ‘de-learning’  process, where the continent, including Uruguay, is losing 
innovation capacities rather than acquiring them (Arocena and Sutz, 2003). We will 
                                                 
16 The concept is analysed by Evans based on the work of Gilpin, Robert (1987) The Political Economy 
of International Relations, Princeton University Press; (Evans, 1995). 
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see in the interviews analysis in chapter 4 how this weak innovation capacity is 
perceived by many key ICT actors. 
A fundamental contribution on this particular field of  ICT and Development 
is the work of Matti Pohjola. Making a cross country analysis the author argues that 
ICTs have had a positive impact on economic growth in developed countries, but not 
in the same way at developing countries (Pohjola, 2001). Utilizing the growth theory 
analysis of Robert M. Solow, the author claim that there has been a limited impact of 
ICT over the development of poor countries, “You can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987 quoted in Pohjola, 2001: 
7). However, other authors consider that impact more significant, (Mansell and When, 
1998) or even discuss the potential capacity of the ICT to ‘leapfrog’ certain phases of 
the development process (Primo Braga;Daly, et al., 2002). Particularly focused on the 
potentiality of software sector on  exports and subsequently over development are the 
works of Richard Heeks (Heeks, 1999a ;1999b; Heeks and Nicholson, 2002). 
An increasing amount of literature put into question in what extent the 
growing of ICTs are really generating an improvement in living conditions for the 
very poor (Saith, 2003) or if ICT are really being included in the general development 
programmes of nations (Schech, 2002). It has to be included into that  sceptical view 
of the information society the work of Christopher May putting into question the real 
potentialities of ICT in terms of development and transformation capacity for the 
whole society (May, 2002). Finally, some works analyse with a critical perspective 
the already considered successful case of Ireland, which has been attracting foreign 




3.3  The role of the state on ICT promotion 
Without doubt, analysing the role of the State in any type of economic 
transformation is quite a complex task. In contrast with the liberal view of natural 
comparative advantages, the dynamic or constructed perspective of comparative 
advantages open space for state intervention to shape a national strategy in order to 
                                                 
17 Figures correspond to a relative poverty line of 40% of the average income. The data source that 
Kirby used is: Nolan, B. et.al. (2000). Monitoring Poverty Trends in Ireland. Results from the 200 
Living in Ireland Survey, Policy Research Series No. 45, Dublin, ESRI. 
  18 
insert a country into a certain international specialization. Many scholars argue that 
due to the amount of investment required as well as to the level of risk of every new 
activity, the presence of the state, particularly in small development countries, has 
been essential (Castells and Laserna, 1994; Evans, 1997; Katz, 1999). Since the 
beginning of the ICT revolution, even in big and developed countries the state played 
a key role in the process, as Castells argue analysing of Internet creation through the 
ARPANET project in the framework of national defence policies in USA (Castells, 
2001: 17-25). 
Some authors also argue that due to the particularly dynamic characteristics of 
the IT sector, “requires continuing technological efforts that strain the capacity of any 
individual firm, especially one located at a distance from the leading edge of the 
market” (Evans, 1995: 218). In developing countries, is difficult to imagine a national 
strategy to move the country into a different position in the international division of 
labour, without an active state role.
18 In a similar argumentative line of the key role of 
the State in the huge transformation of the Information Society, Christopher May 
argues “…the supposition that such a revolution can transpire without a central role 
for the State is mistaken” (May, 2002). The state role on generating human resources 
is also referred by many scholars.
19 We will see how this essential state role is 
strongly mentioned in the interviews. 
The reference to the state role in the generation of ICT infrastructure is 
repeated along the specialized literature. Analysing the experience of the developed 
countries it is clear that the transition to the information society requires high level of 
investments “Without government action there will be too little investment in the 
production and adoption of the new technologies” (Stiglitz, 1998: 714). About Latin 
America, many scholars argue in the perspective of the unavoidable role of the state 
on infrastructure creation (Katz, 1999: ;2000b: ;Ramos, 1993). In the same line, Kirby 
argue that, “the most positive lesson that Ireland offers to Latin America is the active 
role the state has played […]in seeking to upgrade the technological profile of its 
industry” (Kirby, 2003: 52). On the other hand, specific works about countries like 
                                                 
18 Evans even go further in certain institutional determinism: “The character of state institutions helps 
determine weather and how countries change their position in the international division of labour”. 
(Evans, 1995: 246) 
19 Analysing the Brazilian IT sector, Evans argue that “Without connection between educational effort 
and industrial growth, NIC’s can end up using scarce state resources to provide ‘foreign aid’ to the 
United States in the form of highly educated emigrants, as India has been doing for years” Ibid.216). 
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Chile, stress the role of the state not by directly creating the infrastructure, but in 
facilitating the competitive markets to generate the adequate ICT infrastructure 
(Cominetti, 2002). 
Finally, a huge part of the literature on ICT and Development analyse specific 
cases, mostly about countries considered as ‘success stories’. For example the case of 
India with works that analyse its software export growth levels (Tharakan and Van 
Beveren, 2003); or others focused on the eventual capacity of that growth to 
contribute to a broad economic development in a local perspective (Kaushik and 
Singh, 2004). The amount of literature on Ireland is extent, but the work of Peadar 
Kirby is particularly useful as he approach the case from the state role perspective and 
it’s impact on the general development of the country (Kirby, 2004). In the Latin 
American context, it is also well referred the case of Costa Rica (Rodriguez-Clare, 
2002). 
For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to critically understand the 
‘successful’  cases and not just prescribe certain policy recommendations. As Rap 
notes “success depends upon the stabilization of a particular interpretation of events, 
that explains the origin, implementation and outcomes of a policy…” (Rap, 2003: 3). 
The author explains how that particular interpretation can be used to justify the need 
of a similar policy at very different contexts or situations because it “becomes a policy 
model” (Rap 2003:4). As “success is specially contagious” other scholars highlight 
the problem that many times success stories are “imitated blindly, attending to 
popularity rather than performance”(Strang and Macy, 2001: 155). 
 
 
4  ICTS IN URUGUAY: INDICATORS, POLICIES AND ACTORS 
We only ask that the state doesn’t generate obstacles, we know that if we ask for 
help, we are lost. (CEO of a Uruguayan software company).
20
The state is a key actor to define where the ICT sector can go, it should intervene 
with coherence. (CEO of a Uruguayan local software company).
21
 
                                                 
20 Interview Nr.5b. 
21 Interview Nr.10. 
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4.1  Uruguayan basic ICT indicators in the regional context 
Uruguay, with a population of only 3.4 million and a GDP of $12bn in 2002, 
is one of the smallest countries in Latin American and has traditionally shown 
favourable socio-economic indicators when compared to rest of the continent. In 
social capital it has been alternating the first place position with Costa Rica and 
Argentina for the last decade. Uruguay’s literacy rate is 97.7%, with the highest levels 
of secondary and tertiary education enrolment. Life expectancy is 75.3, ranking first 
in spending on public health, as a % of GDP, with 5.1% (UNDP, 2004: 156). 
Furthermore, it has the lowest level of income inequality of the continent, with a Gini 
coefficient of 44.6, much lower than the 57.1 of Chile (UNDP, 2004: 188). The 
political stability has been another relevant characteristic of the country, with the 
highest levels of confidence in democracy and comparatively exceptional public 
institutions that rank second best in the continent (CID, 2003: 33). 
 
Figure 4.1 
Tech Indicators of Uruguay 









Telephone main lines/ 1.000 hab. 
$ of Internet Acces 
Computers /1.000 habs. Int. Hosts/10.000 habs.
Int. Users/ 1.000 habs. 
UY Average ARG - CH - CR  
 
Note: The Cost of Internet is calculated over the average cost of 20hrs of connection, a higher value of the index 
means lower cost. Sources: Calculus made by the author based on data from:: Telephone lines and Internet Users of 
ARG, CH and CR, source:(UNDP, 2004:180-183 ); for Uruguay, year 2002, is (ANTEL 2003:12); for Internet Hosts 
and Computers, year 2003, ITU <www.itu.int>;  and for Cost of Internet, year 2002, source: (CID, 2003). 
 
If we analyse the Uruguayan ICT indicators compared to the average of the 
continent, as many of them are associated with the socio-economic ones, it would 
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easily appear in a favourable position. It is relevant to weight them adequately in 
order to acquire the knowledge of how suitable or not they are, in relation to an 
expected level according to its general development. In this regard, for the purpose of 
this paper the comparison is made with countries of similar development such as 
Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica. From now on, the average of these three countries 
will be referred as the ‘the region’, unless indicated. 
Figure 4.2 
Education and Investment in R&D Indicators of Uruguay 







Tertiary students in science,
math and engineering (%of all
tertiary students)
R&D as % of GDP 
Researchers in R&D (per
million people)
Public Expenditure on
Education as % of GDP 
UY Average ARG - CH - CR  
Source: Calculus of the index made by the author based on data from (UNDP, 2004: 172 and 180-183). 
 
Telecommunications and internet access 
Uruguay is the first country in the continent to have a 100% digital 
telecommunication system and a broadly extended fibre optic network for data 
transmission. In the Global Technology Report 2003, the general ICT infrastructure of 
the country scored first place in the continent and 33rd in the world (CID, 2003: 42). 
Considering telephone density, since 2003, Chile takes first place due to a higher 
mobile penetration. However, as figure 4.1 shows, Uruguay is still ahead of the region 
in main lines telephone density with 281, compared to an average of 233. 
The figures for internet access measured by households connected or by 
quantity of internet access over the total population varies heavily depending on the 
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data sources. Official statistics generated by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
shows that 31% of the Uruguayan population normally use the Internet, a figure that 
goes up to 41% in the population aged 30 or under.  There are important differences 
among the urban-rural areas. While in certain areas of the capital city of Montevideo, 
internet use is over 50%, and 20% of households have a computer, rural areas hardly 
achieve one quarter of these figures. Other intervening variables are the levels of 
income and education. Internet is used regularly by 60% of those on the upper fifth of 
the income scale and 61% of those with tertiary education (ALADI, 2003: ;Lescano 
and Stolovich, 2004). 
As figure 4.2 shows, the cost to connect to the internet in Uruguay is the 
lowest in the region, with $13.4 compared to an average of $20, a monthly cost for 
20hrs. This cost level, and the adequate quality of the infrastructure mentioned before 
are relevant elements to bear in mind when we consider that the investment to 
generate it as well as the operational management is in public hands. Generally, the 
dominant literature of ICTs is reluctant to analyse cases where high quality and low 
price services are associated with SOEs; this issue will appear again in interview 
analyses in chapter 4.3. 
Finally, in figure 4.3 it can be seen how the long economic recession which 
began in 1998 affected the infrastructure related to internet access.  The country is still 
ahead in density of internet hosts, but in relation to the quantity of computers per 
habitant, it lost the first place that it held in 1999 (ITU, 2003). 
Figure 4.3 
Technological indicators pre and post recession 1998 – 2003 
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Source: Elaborated by author from data of (ICD, 2003) and ITU <www.itu.int>. 
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Human Resources for ICT 
The total number of jobs in the sector in 2002 was 7.149, less than 1% of the 
Uruguayan work force.
22 During the severe economic crisis of 2002, while the general 
unemployment had risen to 18.6 (INE), the unemployment of the ICT sector was 
5.5%, which can be considered frictional.
23 In the cost structure of software 
companies, labour represents 70% of the total production costs (Mejía and Rieiro, 
2002: 137). A great proportion of the labour force is highly qualified. Aggregating the 
proportion of engineers, programmers, analysts and high level managing personnel, it 
accounts for 73% of the total (UdelaR, 2004: 13). 
Even though Uruguay has a high rate of university students over the total 
population, the proportion of math, science and engineering students is lower than in 
the region (see figure 4.2). In Argentina and Chile, students corresponding to these 
areas are 30% and 43% of the total, meanwhile in Uruguay they constitute 24% 
(UNDP, 2004: 176). On the other hand, the country is quite backward in terms of 
education spending with 2.5% of the GDP, while the average in the region is 4%. 
There is a similar situation in regards to spending on R&D, where Uruguay invests 
only half of what the region does, in relation to their GDP (see figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.4 
Quantity of informatics graduates in Uruguay 
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Source: Elaborated based on data from UdelaR and University of Montevideo quoted in (Mejía 
and Rieiro, 2004:129). 
                                                 
22 The total work force in Uruguay for that year is 1,249,000 so ICT labour represents 0.57%. Source 
weekly Búsqueda, Montevideo, 16
th September 2004. 
23 The data of unemployment on the software sector is from (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004:28), and 
about general unemployment is from INE: www.ine.gub.uy , accessed on 23 September 2004. 
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Civil society 
Having a ‘long’ tradition of network connections and internet use, NGOs 
began using this medium in the early 90’s, connecting an NGO Network Chasque 
with the academic Central University Computer Service (SECIU) of the UdelaR. This 
state facility plus some tax exemptions for NGOs as consumers, but also as service 
providers, help the organised civil society to be comparatively updated in ICT. A 
recent survey identifies a high level of internet and computer use, with more than 70% 
possessing dedicated e-mail addresses, 60% with internet connection, but only 25% 
owning their own web page (Finquelievich et al., 2004: 181). 
 
The software sector 
The software sector sales in 2002 were  $298 million, representing 2.4% of the 
GDP of that year (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004: 22).  The local companies account 
for 67.6% of the market, while the remaining 32.4% goes to foreign companies due 
mainly to their high participation in the hardware sector. As consequence of the 
economic crisis sales in the local market went down 28.4%, an impact clearly 
presented in figure 4.3. The crisis was particularly strong in the financial sector, 
accounting for 20% of the demand of ICT services in the country (Lescano and 
Stolovich, 2004: 34). 
Exports of products and services totalled $80 million in 2002, which 
represented 4.3% of the total exports for that year (FOB value in current dollars). After 
growing significantly at the end of the 90’s, exports seemed to be stabilizing, and 
have eventually reached its ceiling within the last three years (figure 4.5). From a 
global perspective, this amount constitutes only 0.012% of the world software market. 
However, it should be noted that in absolute terms, Uruguay software exports are 
higher than Argentina or Chile. 
The import of software in 2002 was $11 million, more than 90% from the 
USA. Even though most of the hardware and complementary infrastructure of the ICT 
sector is imported without any significant exports, there is an overall  annual surplus 
in the commercial balance of the ICT sector of almost $70 million (Lescano and 
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Figure 4.5 
Evolution of exports from the Uruguayan software sector 





















Exports (In U$ millons)
 
Source: CUTI Survey, published in (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004: 4)  
 
More than 50 companies export software but half of the total amount is 
concentrated among the 12 biggest ones.  Around 70% of the exports are generated by 
software developer enterprises
24. The highest proportion of its revenues comes from 
consultancy in foreign countries (42.7%) rather than royalties of licensing software 
products (27.1%). When we add the other 14-20% of exports coming from 
consultancy and specific developments from companies that do not develop their own 
software, we see that the professional services constitute between 50-65% of the 
whole software exports (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004). 
Uruguay exports software to a wide spectrum of countries all over the world, a 
total of 45 in 2002, but when weighed by amount, there’s a strong regional 
concentration. Even though Argentina reduced its relative weight after its economic 
crisis in late 2001, it accounts for 21% of the total software exports. After its record a 
high peak of 65% in 2001, currently 52.8 % of exports go to South American 
countries. Two other main destinations are North America (18.7%), with a strong 
participation of Mexico (9.8%), and Europe representing 15.7% of total exports 
(Lescano and Stolovich, 2004). 
                                                 
24 The 2002 CUTI survey divides the ICT enterprises in four categories: 1. Software developers which 
account for 69.3% of exports; 2. Consultancy and services 28.4%; 3. Internet and Data Transmission 
0.5%; and 4. Hardware and Commercialisation 1.8% (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004: 5). 
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Figure 4.6 
Evolution of software exports,  
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Note: Calculus of the index made by the author. Elaborated based on data from: Uruguayan 
Central Bank (BCU)published on weekly Búsqueda, Montevideo, 16
thSeptember 2004 for GDP 
and Exports; and from CUTI Survey, published in (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004: 4) for Software 
Exports. 
 
In summary, the ICT infrastructure of the country as well as the education 
level of the human resources of ICT is of above regional quality.  In regards to the 
software sector, it is important to highlight three characteristics to be considered when 
analysing the type of role that the state plays or could play in the future. First, the 
internal structure of the sector described, heavily concentrated on professional 
services, which clearly shows the human resource intensive characteristic of the 
export products.  Secondly, the export dynamism shown in figure 4.6 reveals that 
since the recession started in 1998, while general exports went down thirty percent, 
software exports moved in similar proportion in an inverse direction. Third, the 
geographical concentration of exports in the regional market (MERCOSUR) and the 
rest of Latin America talks about the difficulty of access, in terms of commercial 
barriers and operational costs, to more developed markets. Keeping these elements in 
mind, we proceed to a general overview of the policies related to the sector. 
 
4.2 State  policies  and initiatives 
Comparatively to the region, the Public Sector Reform process in Uruguay of 
the last decades can be described as slow and gradual. The qualification of this 
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gradualism can vary according to the political and institutional position of the 
observer and to what point in time the evaluation is being conducted.  During the mid 
90’s, the International Finance Institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank (WB) or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), heavily criticised the Uruguayan reform process. 
However, nowadays even though some critics about lack of depth persist, the same 
institutions highlight a positive “democratic and institutional way of processing the 
reforms that did not ‘by pass’ the Parliament”, which was able to implement certain 
market reform while reasonably cushioning the social costs (Ramos, 2004: 93). 
The relevant participation of the Uruguayan state in many economic sectors 
has created a long lasting debate about state market borders. For some, this 
‘demiurge’ role has to do with the absence of capacity of the private sector to generate 
certain infrastructure and investment in a relatively reduced market. On the other 
hand, many claim that the weakness of the private sector is a consequence of such 
state interventions that do not leave space for private capital to emerge, while others 
argue against the constraints of an extremely regulated market. 
Even during its fastest growing period (1992-97), the country hardly achieved 
3.5% to 4.0% GDP growth rates, far from the best years of Argentina (7%) and Chile 
(8%). The struggle for growth has been one of the most important challenges for 
development strategy formulations and policy implementation in Uruguay for at least 
the last 15 years. Between 1985 and 2000, successive government administrations 
promoted different strategic sectors, like agro-industries, forestry, financial and 
logistics services and tourism, with different levels of effectiveness. Even though it 
was not included explicitly among those “strategic” sectors, ICTs have been growing, 
in terms of product, employment, and exports, at the highest rates for the last decade. 
At first glance, there seems to be no-coherent or articulated state strategies to 
promote the ICT sector. As portrayed through the interview analyses, many ICT 
specialists argue that precisely for this virtual absence of the state, the success of the 
sector can be explained. Before going into this debate in chapter 4.3, let’s go through 
the policies and initiatives that are directly or indirectly related to the ICT sector. 
 
State Owned Enterprises 
There are two SOEs in Uruguay that are relevant actors for ICTs as creators of 
infrastructure and consumers of product and services, the National Administration of 
Telecommunications (ANTEL), and the Electricity Generation and Transmission 
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Company (UTE). Together they represent 9.6% of the ICT local market, and 7.7% of 
the total ICT work force (Lescano and Stolovich, 2004: 25). 
UTE owns the monopoly of transmission and distribution of electricity, 
providing a recognised high quality service, a basic condition for the operation of 
ICTs.
25 Even though this SOE is not in the scope of the paper, it is relevant to note 
two elements. First, the aforementioned role of consumer of ICT products and 
services, and secondly, this SOE, as part of its modernization and re-engineering 
process during the 90’s created a consultancy unit call Conex. The company sells and 
exports consultancy services with a strong component of ICTs. At the local level, it 
competes with private actors, particularly for the provision of services to other SOEs 
and institutions. 
ANTEL still has the monopoly of main local and long distance phone 
communications despite some attempts to privatise it under the structural adjustment 
waves in the beginning of the 90’s.
26 In 1999, when international communications and 
data transmission services were liberalized, many multinational companies were 
launched in the country. However, only three years later, mainly due to the prolonged 
recession, most of them abandoned the market.
27 So, even in the areas where there is a 
competence regime: mobile phones, international calls and data transmission, ANTEL 
is still the biggest provider. 
During the last two decades, ANTEL has developed a 100% digital 
telecommunication network that covers the whole country.  Between 1995 and 2000 it 
invested heavily in infrastructure to fully satisfy the increasing demand. Fibre optics 
and satellite communications provide an efficient backbone for phone and data 
transmission inside the country and connecting to the rest of the world. Since 2000, 
the company started several initiatives for promoting connectivity under the 
framework of what was called the Plan Mercurio. The plan facilitated the acquisition 
of computers, providing relatively low prices for commercial and household internet 
connections, and other specific ICTs initiatives. Particularly the Programme of 
                                                 
25 The generation of electricity is legally open to competence, but until now, UTE is the exclusive gen-
erator. 
26 In 1992, a law known as “SOEs Law” was approved. It allowed the total or partial privatisation of 
ANTEL and UTE. After a pro-referendum campaign in mid 1992, part of the law was put under 
plebiscite. The result was an overwhelming rejection of the reform law by 72% of the votes. 
27 Among other companies: Telefónica Data (Spain); Diveo, Velocom, PsiNet. In mid 2003, only 
Techtel (Argentina/México) and Movicom-Bell South (USA) remain in the market. 
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Education Connectivity (PCE) aimed to provide wide band connections to public 
education centres; and the creation of Centres of Access to the Information Society 
(CASI) where citizens had free access to internet.
28
Figure 4. 7 
Evolution of ANTEL Revenues and transfers to public budget 

































Source: Elaborated by author from data of ANTEL: Memoria y Balance Anual (ANTEL 2003: 13).  
 
As figure 4.7 shows, the five years of economic recession affected ANTEL 
heavily. From a peak of U$749m in 2000, the total revenues went into a tailspin down 
to U$455m in 2002 (-39.3%), which significantly reduced its transfers to the public 
budget -55%.
29 Apart from the impact of the crisis, at the end of 2002, ANTEL’s 
president resigned due to disagreements with the central government guidelines in the 
telecommunications policy. According to specialists, this caused a shift in the 
investment policies of companies that affected the infrastructure. For example, the 
Plan Mercurio was suspended at the beginning of 2003. 
 
Laws and regulations 
In terms of the regulatory framework, some important laws, approved in recent 
years, should be noted. In 1999, the software sector was declared as “National 
Interest” by the decree No. 84 providing it with several fiscal benefits such as VAT 
tax devolution over exports. Even more significant, is the decree No. 387/2000 which 
exempts the software sector from the Income Tax for Industry and Commerce 
                                                 
28 There are 25 CASI pilot centres in the country. Source: www.antel.com.uy/antel_social/ social_ 
casi.htm, Accessed on 23
rd August 2004. 
29 Author calculations based on official accounting information of the SOE (ANTEL, 2003). Even 
controlling the currency devaluation effect, there was a decrease of 29.4% in current Uruguayan pesos. 
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Enterprises (IRIC) up to 31
 December 2004. Since mid 2003, the Uruguayan Chamber 
of Information Technologies (CUTI) has been lobbying for the extension of the 
exemption, arguing similar levels of tax reduction in the region, particularly 
Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.
30 As we will see in the interview analyses, this 
exemption is considered as a central issue by the actors of the private sector. 
The same law, (No. 17.296), which opened the competence in international 
telecommunications, internet access and data transmission, also created the 
Communication Regulatory Unit (URSEC). This regulatory agency and competence 
watchdog is in charge of the communication market and has to deal with the 
traditional monopoly operator ANTEL and the new private actors. 
A law approved at the end of 2002, No. 17.616, updated an old law of authors’ 
rights, to include among other things specific references to computer programmes
31.  
The level of software piracy in the country is comparatively high, with a rate of 60% 
in 2002, provoking losses of the local industry, over $4 million according to the anti 
piracy organization Legal Software Uruguay (SUL).
32 The International Intellectual 
Property Alliance put Uruguay in the “priority watch” list (CID, 2003: 304).  
Finally, another important component of the legal framework to be considered 
is the creation of Free Trade Zones.  One of them, ZonaAmerica, is focused on pro-
viding facilities to high technology industries. Taking advantage of the ‘market 
friendly environment’, some of the biggest Uruguayan software companies open of-
fices there to carry on their export activities.  Furthermore, in mid 2002, TaTa Consul-
tancy Services (TCS), the software division of the giant Indian industrial conglomer-
ate, launched its base there for its Latin American operations.  According to CUTI 
estimations, 15.7% of total ICT exports are generated in this free trade zone (Lescano 
and Stolovich, 2004: 26). 
 
                                                 
30 On its official WEB site, the CUTI announces a virtual approval of an extension of the tax reduction, 
at least for six more months, by the government of President Batlle; http://www.cuti.org.uy/portal , 
accessed on 17 June 2004. 
31 The law was formally promulgated on 10 January 2003.  It modifies the previous law Nr. 9739 from 
year 1937. It should also be mentioned that the law No.17.164 from 2
  September 1999, refers to 
protection of patents and includes ICT related products. 
32 Data published in El Observador, 12 June, 2003. 
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Special programmes 
The creation of the National Committee for the Information Society (CNSI) 
was one of the most promoted initiatives when the new government administration 
took office in March 2000.
33 The CNSI was created to provide policy 
recommendations on ICTs and articulate private interests and public initiatives. It was 
constituted by the President himself, and representatives of public and private 
universities, ANTEL, the URSEC, and the CUTI. It was organised into five areas: i. 
informatics alphabetisation; ii. E-government; iii. modernizations of the public 
administration; iv. telecommunication and internet market improvement; and v. 
strength and competitiveness of the software sector. 
As executive unit of the CNSI, “Uruguay Net” was created.
34 But soon after 
activities started, its director, a young well reputed engineer left the programme for a 
post in the IADB. Replacing him was a lawyer without a relevant curriculum on the 
area. As we will see in the interview analyses, this change caused an important loss of 
credibility for the CNSI among the key actors of the sector. The meetings were few, 
and in the beginning of 2003, the CNSI was, despite not being formally dissolved, not 
operative at all. 
In mid 2003, academics and entrepreneurs conceived a new initiative to 
regenerate the institutional space that the CNSI was leaving.  With this purpose, the 
Academic-Industrial Centre for the Information Technologies (CAITI) was created.  
The intention was to operate a coordination centre between academics, entrepreneurs 
and the government in a more bottom-up profile, rather than the CNSI’s clearly top-
down profile, from the presidency to the market actors. The CAITI has specific tasks, 
such as creating a testing centre for locally generated software products. 
On the other hand, some programmes oriented to support the ICT sector were 
created. The most important one, in terms of budget, is the Programme of Technology 
Development (PDT), with a total budget of $45 million, financed mostly by the Inter 
American Bank (IADB), but with a relevant amount of local funds. This Programme 
co-finances the development of new software and high tech products. The programme 
had presented severe problems of execution because of transfer delays and shortcuts 
of funds from the central government. 
                                                 
33 The CNSI was created by the Executive decree 225/00 in August 2000. 
34 See www.uruguayenred.gub.uy. 
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Another relevant initiative is the Programme for the Support of Software 
Sector (PASS). The programme’s objective is to improve the international 
competitiveness of small software enterprises through three main instruments: i. 
training in financial aspects, marketing, quality of production processes and others; ii. 
technical assistance in quality management and marketing, iii. generation and 
provision of information, and networking to facilitate exports.  The PASS is carried 
out by the CUTI, and financed mainly by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the 
IADB (55%) and local counterparts (45%).
35 Since mid 2002, more than half of the 
members of the CUTI, 107 out of 180 enterprises, have participated in different 
activities of  the PASS (Stolovich, 2003: 26). 
 
E-Government 
As part of the aforementioned Plan Mercurio , comprehensive initiatives of e-
government were created by a national government portal.
36 This is a gateway to 
almost all public institutions and ministries, and allows the citizens access to different 
public information and services.  As example, it can be noted that the portal of the 
System of State Acquisitions (SICE), apart from providing information of auctions 
and prices, promotes electronic relations between enterprises and the state, which 
foster the ICT incorporation into them.
37 At the local level, the Municipality of 
Montevideo, accounting for almost 50% of the country population, has developed in 
the last decade an important quantity of services that can be done through internet. 
This e-government is complemented by the law Nr. 17243, which in Arts. 24 and 25, 




With the education Reform process carried out between 1995-2000, significant 
investments on ICT infrastructure and connectivity at primary and secondary 
education levels were developed. This put the country over the regional levels in 
indicators such as quantity of education centres connected to internet, computers per 
                                                 
35 T h e  t o t a l  b u d g e t  o f  t h e  P A S S  i s  U $  1 . 6  m i l l i o n .   S o u r c e  C U T I  o f f i c i a l  w e b - s i t e :  www. 
cuti.org.uy accessed on 17 June 2004. 
36 See www.uruguay.gub.uy . 
37 See www.comprasestatales.gub.uy  
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pupil and the existence of computer education as a curricular subject at secondary 
level. 
In tertiary education, the public spending has been dropping during the last 
two government periods, and the country is clearly below regional average. However, 
the UdelaR is an extremely important actor in the ICT sector. Being the only national 
university, it is financed exclusively by public funds, with no fees or recovery costs 
for students at the graduate level. The UdelaR accounts for 85% of the total of tertiary 
students, and approximately 95% of the R&D activities in the country.
38 It started 
informatics careers as early as the late 60’s, and has generated around 55% of the total 
work force of technology and computer engineers during the last decade (see figure 
4.4). 
A university initiative, the Programme for the Development of Basic Sciences 
(PEDECIBA), which also includes Informatics, was particularly relevant during the 
second half of the 80’s to help bring back many ICT experts that left the country 
during the military dictatorship period (1973-1984). In the 90’s, the PEDECIBA 
financed MA and PhD postgraduates in informatics for the INCO professors. Since 




In 2004, a capital investment fund was launched in the Uruguayan ICT 
market. Even though this is mainly a private initiative, the risk capital fund called 
Uruguay International Venture Capital (UIVC), also has the participation of the IADB 
and the National Corporation for Development (CND), a government agency. The 
purpose of the UICV is to invest in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of the 
Uruguayan IT sector, particularly those export oriented.
39
In summary, except from the education and telecommunication policies, it is 
not possible to identify a coherent articulation of the policies and initiatives that were 
specifically conceived to promote the ICT sector. Needless to say, the coordination 
between them which is almost inexistence. The effective implementation of many of 
                                                 
38 Data from Uruguayan Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
39 Apart from the IADB and the CND, the main promoter in the UICV is a private actor, Prosperitas 
Capital Partners. The capital fund is planning to invest in 12 to 15 SMEs in the next five years, with an 
average of U$500.0000 per project. 
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the policies has been, in the best cases, partial. The above mentioned PDT had been 
receiving only half of the expected funds, the CNSI virtually disappeared before half 
of the government period was completed, and the “Plan Mercurio” was partially 
implemented and then suspended. In this context, the following chapter analyses the 
opinions of the key actors about the discussed indicators and policies, presenting their 
perspectives on what the state role should be in the ICT sector. 
 
4.3  The ICT main actors opinions 
The third component of the analysis, that helps us to make the link between 
ICT indicators and policies, is the perspectives of the key actors. In this regard, with 
the analytical framework and the data presented, we will critically analyse their 
opinions in the two dimensions set in the research objective. First, what role the state 
had been and actually does play in the ICT sector and what it should play. Secondly, 
their perspectives about the state-market relations in the sector, to try to explain the 
degree of autonomy that the state has to design and implement its policies. 
Table 4.1 
Interviews to ICT actors in Uruguay 




Chief Executives of top software, hardware  
and consulting ICT companies 
5
a 1, 5, 5b, 10 
and 12 
Chief Executives of Private Telco. Companies  2
b 2 and 4 
Chief Executive of State Owned Telco. Company   1  6 
Prestigious ICT Academics from Public University   3  3, 3b and 7 
Prestigious ICT Academics from Private Universities  2
c 9 and 9b 
Experts on ICT in Uruguay   1  8 




a. Three are national software companies which are among the top five exporters; two are 
international and among the largest and most well known global companies. 
b. The two private telecommunication companies are the only ones which have their own 
infrastructure and provide both data transmission and international phone communication. 
c. From the three private universities that provide training on informatics the largest two were 
interviewed. 
d. Four more interviews that appeared in the press, two CEOs of software companies and two 
recognised specialists, were incorporated in the analysis totalling the opinion of 19 key actors. 
 
As was explained in the methodology section of the introduction chapter, the 
information provided by the interviewees is treated confidentially. The table 4.1 
presents the detail of the type of actors and area of work matched with the 
identification numbers to properly weigh up their opinions when they are quoted 
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along the text. Apart from the 15 direct interviews, during the press review some 
others were identified that cover the topics of the research and thus also incorporated 
into the analyses. In those cases they are identified with the proper reference. 
 
State role on ICT promotion 
The different actors consulted recognise the centrality of the ICTs as a key 
factor to foster development. One specialist claims “In the current information society 
there is a strong change in the way wealth is generated […] knowledge has become 
the main production factor, which generates an intensive demand of qualified 
workers”  (Int. 8).The Uruguayan long run difficulty to define and implement an 
integral development strategy is, in the majority opinion, is also inhibiting the 
definition of one for the ICT sector. So, despite not being something new, the actors 
agree that the tech sector has certain particularities that make necessary a specific 
approach. Those elements can be traced through their opinions presented in the 
following pages. 
 
A ‘positive absence’ of policies? 
The overwhelming majority of the interviewed, from all areas, argue that in 
Uruguay there has not been direct promotion policies for the ICT sector, at least this is 
their first answer when specifically interrogated. A few examples are: 
There are no policies, in this country there is not a single promotion measure 
(Int.4). 
I think that there are no policies to promote the ICT sector, perhaps they should 
be, but the fact is that there are none (Int. 5). 
There is no national vision in this area, no definition of where we want to go (Int. 
2). 
Even the ones who recognise certain promotion initiatives, they visualise them 
not as being part of a coherent strategy: “The state has never communicated what its 
strategic vision is on the ICT sector, there is certain support, but they are isolated 
initiatives, not something coordinated” (Int. 1). 
It is interesting to note that not all the actors consider the absence of promo-
tion policies as something particularly negative. Many of them, mostly entrepreneurs 
but also many academics and specialists, in fact argue that this has been something 
positive for the strengthening of the sector: 
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The ‘luck’ that the software sector had is that the state didn’t realise the importance of 
the sector and so it did not tried to help […]a perverse thing is that often the state is 
more an anchor than a promoter because it becomes bureaucratic and politicised 
(Int.8). 
Ironically, precisely with the absence of promotion policies the state has been one of 
the promoters of the exports of the ICT industry (Int. 7). 
As the two quotes at the opening page of this chapter show, the positive 
perspective about the eventual absence of policies is far from being a homogenous 
opinion, even among actors inside the private sector. The CEO of a software company 
claims, “I don’t think the success of the ICT sector is because the state was not 
involved, they are absolutely complementary, the state strengthens the private 
enterprises”  (Int. 10). Others accept a potential role of the state, but they do not 
consider it as the defining factor: “If the state would have had policies, many things 
probably would have happened faster or would be better, but it is not the ‘sine qua 
non’ of the development of the ICT sector […] it grew up open to the outside world, 
their market is the world, not the state” (Int. 8). 
Many accept a potential relevant state role, but put into question the state 
capacity to generate promotion policies. Not only from the entrepreneurs perspective, 
who have appreciations such as, “I don’t want protection, however promotion is 
welcome. But, why is this sector not being promoted? Perhaps because the state 
doesn’t know how to promote it” (Int. 4); but also from academics who consider that, 
“there is a lack of policies but also, and more importantly, a lack of capacity to 
generate them” (Int.3). As was discussed in chapter 2, when considering possible state 
role, it’s clear the importance of analysing its capacity to design and effectively 
implement the policy. 
When trying to identify the causes of state weakness, the old weberian 
dichotomy of bureaucrats and politicians arises, “There are capable people inside the 
state to implement the policies, the problem is the political system. The ones who 
filter the effective implementation of policies are the political directors of SOE and 
ministries” (Int. 11). 
 
The necessity of an institutional framework 
Most of the actors consulted, either from public or private sectors agree on the 
necessity of an effective institutional framework. They recognise its impact on the 
mid and long run performance of the ICT sector, aligned with the institutionalist 
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approach discussed in chapter 2. Nevertheless, the type and amount of intervention 
desired varies heavily. Even inside the entrepreneur sector, opinions vary from a more 
central state role such as, “The role that the state should play is to create a clear and 
stable institutional framework, currently there’s no coordination and articulation of 
the initiatives” (Int. 8) to a more liberal or ‘pro-business’ state attitude, “We believe in 
a role of the state as a facilitator, rather than an intervening actor or a regulator” (Int. 
12). 
Without exemption, the actors stress the necessity, that no matter what type of 
role the state plays, in order to be effective that institutional framework has be clear 
and stable. Also, many believe that certain basic definitions should be made avoiding 
the political shifts that the electoral cycle generates. 
In general there is a problem of management capacity in the public policies, that 
has to do with the set of rules and the characteristics of the political system (Int. 
11).  
For sure the state is a key actor in defining where the ICT sector can go, […] the 
state should intervene and must do it with coherence (Int. 10). 
The same ‘pro-business state role’ entrepreneurs recognise the unique role of 
the state in certain tasks: “The design, implementation and execution of an integral 
development strategy require an articulation of policies that probably each individual 
actor cannot see with the necessary global perspective” (Int. 12). 
It is interesting to note how the same entrepreneurs whose first reaction to the 
question of the state role was not to intervene at all, or that it has not been doing 
anything positive, gave quite wide spectrum of requirements in specific areas about 
what they expect from state once they were consulted. According to the responses, 
certain areas can be identified where the key informants visualize the state role as 
being determinant. 
 
a. Human Resources 
Many of the managers of the biggest companies claim that in case of a faster 
growth of the ICT sector, the country could face a shortage of qualified labour. In a 
press interview at the end of 2003 the CEO of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) 
explained: “Last year 270 people graduated in informatics, our company alone 
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required 150”.
40 In august 2004 the same company decided to hire professionals from 
other areas and train them in informatics at their own training centre, aiming to hired 
500 new employees in the following two years.
41
That fear of an over demand is also shared by most of the academics who 
reckon the low number of engineers or computer analysts who receive degrees each 
year (see figure 4.4). For academics of the private sector the reduced number has to do 
mainly with cultural matters of young Uruguayan students who do not  have a natural 
propensity to maths, science and engineering disciplines, and that the secondary 
education system is not successful in generating a better proximity to those fields: 
“…the ones who have vocation are destroyed by the difficulties of the college courses 
of engineer related options” (Int. 9). Comparative statistics presented in figure 4.2 
supports that view. 
Complementary to this view, even if they agree on the absence of a natural 
vocation in the local students, academics from the UdelaR argue that there are also 
significant endogenous reasons related to the difficulties of the education system that 
achieve high levels of quality but have severe problems with quantity: 
Part of the problem is the method of how engineers are produced, the method is 
based on the ‘genocide’ of a generation. The first year you kill one half, the 
second year another half, as well as in the third, the ones who survive are for 
sure of high calibre. This is an effective method to produce high quality 
professionals but a destructive method to achieve quantity! (Int. 7). 
Despite the fact of reduced quantity, all the actors interviewed agree that the 
exceptional level of the Uruguayan informatics professionals is one of the key 
elements to explain the relative success of the sector. This has to do, according to 
them, with a comparatively premature start of computer related careers in the UdelaR 
in the late 60’s. What is more, some of the entrepreneurs consider the education 
policy not only to be of good quality, but as the only existing policy on the ICT 
sector: 
We take advantage of the only existing policy of having an early and very good 
informatics education, the UdelaR launched its first computer career in 1967and at 
that moment only four or five countries had it. […] Who can educate people for 
something that will happen in ten years? Only the state can do that (Int. 5) 
                                                 
40 Official figures indicate a total of 253 graduates on informatics for year 2002. Interview with Gabriel 
Rozman CEO of TCS Ibero-America, published in El Observador, Montevideo, 28
th December 2003. 
41 Data provided by the CEO of TCS Ibero-America Gabriel Rozman in an interview on Radio El 
Espectador, Montevideo on the 29
th of September 2004. www.espectador.com. 
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We have an advantage from the beginning to perform well in ICTs, because good 
quality tertiary education, this has been a good strategy, but we have to try not to 
lose it (Int. 8) 
The quality of education that professionals receive in the public university is 
considered as a comparative advantage by the entrepreneurs consulted. The CEOs of a 
national software company that at the same time represents locally one of the biggest 
global software giants claim, “I think that the INCO of the UdelaR is a lighthouse in 
the region […] comparatively in the region we are in a very good position in terms of 
HHRR” (Int. 10). 
 
b. Investment on R&D 
In the same way that Castells argues about the central role of the state in the 
creation of the Internet through the ARPANet project (Castells, 2001: 10-17), most of 
the actors refer to the key role of the state as initiator of the process by investing in 
education and R&D. The INCO of the UdelaR was created at the end of the 60’s and 
since then “The state has been investing a lot in HHRR, specially since 1985, helping 
students and professors to study abroad for MAs and PhDs, many who are now the 
teachers at the INCO” (Int. 3b). However, in recent years the public budget for R&D 
has been decreasing, “Uruguay is quite backwards in investment on R&D. If we look 
at the region, including Argentina with all its problems, the policies on R&D are 
much better” (Int. 7). The data presented on chapter 4.2, clearly shows the current 
disadvantageous position on investment on R&D (see figure 4.3). 
Some of the entrepreneurs argue in favour of trying to concentrate the national 
software production close to what Vernon calls the ‘innovative end’ of the software 
product cycle which was discussed in the chapter 3. A CEO of a software company 
explains, “We need a paradigm shift, we have to work at a high level, where a high 
level of specification is required, and the rest, which is done by cheap labour 
programming, could be accomplished with automatic tools” (Int. 5). It is clear that 
such an innovative integrated system requires an adequate articulation of the synergy 
of the different actors. The CNSI was originally conceived to play a central 
coordination role, but its life was short as well as unproductive. The CAITI centre 
appeared to play that role. 
An entrepreneur directly involved in the creation of the centre argues about its 
importance, “This a ‘creature’ born from a death mother, the CNSI […] often the state 
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does not have confidence in the technical capacity of the local ICT sector, so how can 
you create that confidence? I think that the CAITI, as a testing centre, is a solution” 
(Int. 10). From the perspective of the academics from the INCO, the potential of the 
centre as a policy instrument is more than relevant: 
This requires that the state should be united with the industry and the academic 
sector. We need a prospective study that can show us where we can go, the 
CAITI is one of the first centres of this type inside the state. It can be a very 
useful tool when the state wants to elaborate policies (Int. 7) 
c. The state as a consumer of ICT services 
All over the world public institutions are one of the main consumers of ICT 
products and services. Particularly in small developing countries, the proportion of the 
state market is even greater, and local as well as multinational companies see the state 
as one of its main clients. Apart from the revenues that selling to a big client can 
generate, software entrepreneurs are sometimes even more interested on generating 
the know how and experience of implementing big scale ICT projects that can be 
shown in foreign markets. In Uruguay, due to the relatively restricted privatisation 
processes, analysed in chapter 4.2, the state apparatus is still quite large. 
The CEO of a multinational software company argues:  “The point is, in 
Uruguay the presence of SOEs and other public institutions is very important, much 
bigger in proportion than in other countries, the huge computer centres are there, so a 
relevant part of our market is there”  (Int. 1). Another interviewee, also from a 
multinational software company claims: “The relative weight of the state in Uruguay 
is very important, the main companies are SOEs. The state has a huge ICT 
infrastructure and thus is a significant portion of the market” (Int. 12). An opinion 
also shared by academics: “The state has an investment capacity that the private sector 
doesn’t possess in Uruguay” (Int. 9b). 
The role of the state as a big consumer is also perceived by the state actors 
themselves: “In this country, from the biggest ten consumers six are public 
institutions. Most of the ones who demand for privatisation measures have been living 
from the state for ages!” (Int. 6). 
Several of the interviewees stress the role of the state in setting certain 
standards and regulatory norms of product and processes to help create a market of 
sub-products. This requires, according to an academic: “The political intention, high 
levels of coordination of the ICT policies among the different state areas, and an 
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improvement of the qualifications of the professionals that are in key decision places” 
(Int. 3). This is another example of how the state can have an impact on the 
development of the sector either with action or omission. 
 
d. The role of the telecommunication SOE 
Without doubt, the telecommunication state company is a particularly central 
actor in the ICT sector development process. Most of the interviewed considered that 
the infrastructure on telecommunications is more than adequate in the country but that 
currently the investment is descending. A specialist argues: “At the beginning of the 
90’s the infrastructure was, comparatively to the region, very good, however during 
the last years the investment didn’t continue, resulting in a rapid backwards slide” 
(Int.8). The data presented on the impact of the recession on tech indicators clearly 
shows the deterioration process (see figures 4.3 and 4.7). Another intervening variable 
is the shift on the policy mentioned in chapter 4.2, a state bureaucrat considered that:  
Previously ANTEL had a much more modern project with a clear vision of the 
information society, but with the change of its president during this government 
period, the way was truncated (Int. 11).
Considering the quality of services, but particularly costs there is a clear and 
predictable difference on opinions depending in which side, state or market the 
interviewee is on. The interviewees from the state think that, “The infrastructure is 
good, all digital and a good network of optic fibre. This is a ‘sine qua non’ condition 
for the development of the ICT sector” (Int. 11), but entrepreneurs insist that the 
communications are expensive and possess not enough band width for data transfer to 
foreign countries. About this particular point, from ANTEL, the perspective is 
completely different: “ANTEL is paying for a band width that is not being fully used, 
there is not enough demand to use it!” (Int. 6). 
Referring to international connections, during the second half of the 90’s there 
were many offers from international data transfer operators to make ANTEL part of 
multinational interconnection initiatives. However, the telecommunication company 
was quite reluctant to those investments. For some private actors this was negative: 
“We had the opportunity and we made the wrong decisions” (Int. 2). However, for 
ANTEL authorities that was a necessary cautious attitude: “Most of the projects went 
bankrupt. I am not here to take risks, the risk is for the private actors, I am here to 
manage an enterprise that is a state owned one” (Int. 6). 
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In relation to state capacity, all the interviewees reckon a high level of 
technical capacity from ANTEL to design and implement policies with high 
autonomy to make decisions. The private operators argue that despite the fact that 
there is a regulatory agency, the technical capacity and thus the effective decision 
making process is inside the SOE. 
ANTEL has the expertise, it used to be the only player as we were under a 
monopoly situation, so they concentrate the knowledge and sometimes we are in 
a disadvantageous position when we negotiate with them. There is a regulatory 
agency, but it is still not strong enough, the ones who decide are the engineers of 
ANTEL, and they know about the topic! (Int. 2). 
The URSEC was created but it’s still ‘in diapers’. In practice it is absolutely 
clear that ANTEL manages the market. It should be the URSEC that setting the 
rules, but it doesn’t do it (Int. 4). 
These quotes rise a very relevant point that has to do which the decision 
process inside the state, or where the decisions are effectively being taken. The 
URSEC perspective is different from the entrepreneurs: “We deal with all the actors 
as equal enterprises, however, we don’t allow the companies, even the state owned 
ones, to set the policy” (Int. 11). The entrepreneurs vision is in a way confirmed by 
the interviewee from ANTEL who explained how the  SOE has been investing heavily 
in education and technical training and highlighting the “enormous capacity and 
preparation of ANTEL engineers who make the decisions in operational matters” (Int. 
6). So, in his opinion, if there is a problem of capacity, “the absence of capacity is in 
the private sector, not in the public one” (Int. 6). 
 
e. State support in the world markets 
The absence of a coherent and permanent national strategy for insertion into 
the global markets is a difficulty constantly referred, particularly by the entrepreneurs 
and specialists, “The strategy of our country to the world is not clear at all. Six or 
seven years ago we bet on the MERCOSUR, three years ago we bet on the ALCA, 
nowadays we don’t bet on anything” (Int. 8). 
Even the biggest local companies are very small in the global context, so 
strategies that can aggregate forces such as commercial missions sponsored by the 
state are mentioned as essential. However, entrepreneurs are sceptical about state 
capacity to play that role: “We had been invited to some commercial missions 
accompanying government representatives but they’re so badly organised that in 
many cases we decided not to participate” (Int. 5b). A good example that clearly 
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shows the type of scale difficulties that local companies face is the one of Interactive 
Networks, whose messaging software product was selected by the prestigious PC 
Magazine as the only Latin American finalist in the competition at the Technology 
trade show Comdex. However, its director explains: “We’ve lost major deals just 
because we couldn’t afford to send someone to New York and spend a week bidding 
on contracts […] you can only count on friends and family for so long”.
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f. Other areas of state involvement 
There are other specific areas mentioned by the interviewee where the 
presence or absence of the state is considered relevant. Despite being areas where 
there’s no homogenous opinions among the different actors on which should be the 
state role, are in all cases relevant topics that should be mention. 
Promotion Programmes: Most the actors interviewed, including those from 
the government are very critical with the CNSI “The results were non-existent, in fact 
it disappeared, and the authorities in charge didn’t have any legitimacy at all among 
the sector” (Int. 8). Entrepreneurs are not very optimistic on the usefulness of specific 
promotion programmes. Juan Grompone, a well respected engineer and expert on ICT 
claims “The ICT enterprises do not need the support of the state or a special 
programme for its promotion, they only need to be clear of obstacles” (Grompone, 
2004). 
Legal Framework: Like any other economic sector the entrepreneurs demand 
clear rules to set their business. In this regard, certain general agreements among the 
actors can be identified “In a country such as Uruguay with a very small local market, 
not very attractive for its volume, it is even more important that the rules are very 
clear.”  (Int. 4)  “The rule should be clear, maintained along time and well 
communicated. The investment is not recovered in a short time, so we need a clear 
and stable legal framework” (Int. 1). 
Protection of Property Rights: In general, the role of assuring property rights 
is not mentioned as one of the main roles of the state, except from a well known 
multinational software company which claimed, “The levels of piracy in Uruguay are 
high and we need the state to tackle this” (Int. 12). It is important here to bear in mind 
                                                 
42 Interview to Pablo Salomon, director of Interactive Networks, published in magazine Latin Trade, 
January 2004. 
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the internal structure of the software sector. As was mentioned in the description of 
the sector in chapter 4.1, the majority of the revenues do not come from royalties of 
software programmes but from consultancy and implementations services that can 
hardly be objects of piracy. 
Country Image: There is quite a broad consensus around the importance of 
generating a country image related with technology, “To create a ‘country brand’ 
associated with technology is very important, and this is an issue of public policy” 
(Int.6). Even the more sceptical actors about state intervention support a central role of 
the state in this task. Academics found certain inconsistency: “What is the country 
image that we have, Uruguay Natural or Digital? Sometimes it seems that we have a 
schizophrenic behaviour” (Int. 9). The works of Alice Amsden, referred in chapter 3, 
regarding the role of Taiwanese state in ICT promotion go well in hand with that 
perspective (Amsden, 2004). 
Capital Investment: Some of the interviews consider that the state can also 
have a role as an investor, “For example investing the pension funds, as a 
demonstrating role, to prove that the ICT sector is a strategic one and must be 
supported in Uruguay” (Int. 8). Or facilitating the access to cheap credit, a role that 
many entrepreneurs mention as a very important deficit: “In the world, this industry is 
capital consuming and here we have to generate our own capital, […] the banks lend 
money to the traditional industries that have machines or buildings as collateral but 
not to us, needless to say, capital risk for investment, and this is a serious problem” 
(Int. 5). A view that is also shared by experts, “There is no system of capital risk here, 
and that is essential for the dynamism of the information society” (Int. 8). 
 
State-Market relations and the issue of autonomy 
The neo-utilitarian vision that as state interventions increase, so does the 
generation of rents and thus the rent-seeking attitudes of the private sector, is shared 
by several actors, particularly the entrepreneurs themselves. They assume that they 
will be more interested in creating close relations with state bureaucrats, than in 
generating wealth by innovative production. A big local software exporter says, “I 
don’t think state protection is good, protection automatically means inefficiency…” 
but later the same entrepreneur reckons “obviously if there is a local market model 
that allows my business to arise at its first stages, that helps!” (Int. 5). 
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The lack of a national coherent development strategy in general in Uruguay 
opens the field to rent seeking attitudes of the different economic sectors. The 
interviewees coincide that this is a severe problem of the traditional economic 
structure: “There’s no strategy, so everyone tries to look for certain subsidies or 
exemptions according to their lobbying capacity” (Int. 1). The interviewees almost 
unanimously support the idea that the sector has a weak lobbying capacity and non 
direct access to key state decision levels: 
The profile of people that are in the ICT sector is different from the traditional 
economic sectors that had a culture of lobbying the government. This is a new 
sector, they don’t waste time with the state, their market is the world (Int. 2) 
These entrepreneurs have little relation with politicians, they don’t go to the state 
first to solve their problems (Int 3). 
In this country the traditional economic groups have lobbying capacity, but this 
capacity in our sector is almost inexistent (Int.4) 
From the perspective of the actors inside the state the image of the lobbying 
capacity of the sector is not so reduced or weak: “The lobbying of the CUTI is the 
best of this country, don’t underestimate it! It’s a modern one, and very effective. 
They had the tax exemptions and they will have the labour deregulation for their 
sector soon” (Int.6). A specialist argues that, “Without doubt they knock on the doors 
of the state, and they are successful in their demands”  (Int. 8).  Even some 
entrepreneurs recognise that: “The CUTI has its lobbying capacity, in the ‘good 
sense’, it has it […] is not a little thing to have the income tax exemption” (Int. 1). 
In relation with the regulatory agency (URSEC), most of the interviewees 
agree that, as every new institution, there is still a long way to go to consolidate that 
institutional space: “The URSEC doesn’t have an easy relation with nobody because it 
is playing a role that has never existed before” (Int. 8). The capacity of URSEC to 
design and implement the policies, as well as in terms of autonomy, especially from 
the SOEs, is still weak. 
The interviewee from the regulatory unit recognises that the technical capacity 
is necessary but not enough: “The effectiveness of the URSEC will depend on the 
technical capacity of its personnel but also on the political support, to achieve 
autonomy you also need political support” (Int. 11). We can see that the combination 
of technical capacity in a context of embedded autonomy, as was discussed in chapter 
2, is identified as essential by the actors involved. The incipient cooperation 
experiences at the CAITI most of the actors recognise that can constitute an 
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institutional space for an adequate interaction of state and market actors, because until 
now “There’s nobody inside the state with a minimum level of credibility to deal with 




There is a growth dilemma now in the Uruguayan ICT sector. The dilemma is or 
even we growth or we go backwards, in this sector stability is not possible 
(Academic from the INCO, UdelaR).
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5.1 Concluding  remarks 
This paper analyse the state role in promoting the ICT sector in developing 
countries through the Uruguayan case. Its findings help to better understand the 
specific country experience as well as provide useful elements for other countries 
pursuing development strategies strongly supported on ICTs. All around the world the 
ICT sector is generating important amounts of resources what will be an increasing 
phenomenon in the nearer future. In this regard, the type of policies that states are able 
to design and implement to foster the development of the sector have a relevance that 
exceed the sector itself. 
The literature reviewed suggest that to the problems of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in policy design and implementation that traditionally affected 
developing countries, when referring to the ICT sector, even new problems are added. 
As a continuously changing and extremely globalise sector it requires high level of 
dynamism and professional expertise from every actor involved. Developing countries 
sates are not precisely in a high position at the ranking of fast actors and the capacity 
of bureaucratic apparatuses to attract and maintain highly skilled professionals is, in 
the best cases, limited. Furthermore, the institutional framework of ICT sector, 
necessary to generate an environment that assure state autonomy and private sector 
efficiency is, in general terms, still weak. The empirical evidence presented and the 
critical analysis of the opinions of the key actors involved confirmed these elements 
for the Uruguayan case. 
Uruguayan ICTs sector have been performing comparatively well during the 
analysed  period. The sector initially  developed  independently  from  the  state  in  an 
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outward oriented strategy, growing constantly and expanding exports even under a 
recession context, with just a few direct promotion policies. However, that doesn’t 
mean a virtual absence of the sate. The role of Uruguayan state has been a 
combination of ‘demiurge’  role with strong and relatively efficient SOE’s and a 
‘husbandry’ role setting measures like tax exemption to promote an already existent 
private sector. Certain policies and state initiatives created the conditions that made 
this phenomenon possible: an efficient public ICT infrastructure, specially 
telecommunication and electricity network, created and managed by SOEs; the early 
creation of high quality informatics tertiary education and a regulatory framework that 
includes significant tax exemptions. 
The particular role of the telecommunication SOE with a long lasting 
accumulation of technical capacity and the generation of high quality infrastructure 
proved to be a more than relevant precondition. Moreover, the human resources 
generation as well as the R&D investment at the public university are also key 
explaining variables of the whole process. The empirical evidence presented about the 
downward in national ICT indicators due to the economic crisis of mid 2002 and the 
referred public policy shifts provides a clear evidence of the consequences of 
reductions on public investment. 
Currently, the degree of autonomy of institutions and SOEs to take decisions 
on ICTs policy seem to be acceptable. However, the lack of state capacity to design 
and implement policies appears to be a significant problem. The absence of adequate 
specific institutions, repeatedly referred by the actors and empirically confirmed along 
the research, can be a severe difficulty. If the sector becomes one of the country main 
exporters, and thus a bigger generator of resources, the state–market relation it is 
expected to change. That will influence further state intervention. The better the 
institutions generated can be, the more probable that the state can visualize the ICT 
sector as a genuine opportunity for national development rather than a simple fount to 
extract resources. 
As the literature review presented suggests, also confirmed by the actors 
opinions, as closer to the innovative end the ICTs products are, the higher the added 
value and thus the better the impact over the general development of the country. This 
proximity to the innovative end requires an active and efficient state role on ICT 
promotion. In the Uruguayan case, this role has to do with increasing investment on 
education and R&D, strengthening the telecommunications infrastructure, defining a 
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coherent policy for the public sector as an ICTs products and services consumer, 
promoting capital risk investment, and facilitating private actors access to foreign 
markets by the construction of a high tech ‘country brand’ and by pursuing more 
favourable commercial agreements. 
In conclusion, some lessons can be learned from the Uruguayan case useful to 
other small developing countries. The strategic vision necessary for long run 
investment with uncertain results, at least at it early stages, it can only be carried out 
by a public entity, such as the generation of infrastructure by SOEs or investment on 
human resources and R&D by a public university. The state role as an investor and 
consumer of ICTs products and services in contexts of relatively weak local markets 
is also a key issue. This role of ‘big consumer’, if strategically used, can be a relevant 
instrument to help enterprises to achieve scale of production and implementation 
experience. This, combined with diplomatic support, can significantly improve local 
companies access to foreign markets and thus increase export levels. 
 
5.2  Future lines of research 
Additional research is required in the area of state role on ICT promotion in 
developing countries. For example, much more knowledge still has to be generated 
for a better conceptualisation of the state role in order to deal with the particularities 
of the ICT sector and its transformation potentiality at developing countries. 
On the other hand, further questions arise in the Uruguayan case. If, as 
suggested along the paper, Uruguay is facing its ceiling on ICTs sector growth and it 
becomes necessary a new state role for a second phase, what are the pre-conditions 
necessary to make such a change possible? In this regard, in the case that a new 
development strategy strongly sustained on ICT sector emerge, and the state policy 
efforts are focus on that in a context of always scarce resources, what consequences 
that could have over the policies on traditional promoted sectors? 
Finally, two significant elements that will affect the Uruguayan ICT sector in 
the near future should be noted. First, after five consecutive years of economic 
recession the country started to grow in 2003 and this is not yet registered by the 
national ICTs indicators. Second, for first time in Uruguayan history, a left wing party 
won the presidential elections of October 2004. The implications that this will have 
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over the prospects of ICTs and development will entail further analysis and significant 
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